21世纪布雷顿会议 中国是否当年的美国/ A 21st-Century Bretton Woods

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21世纪布雷顿会议 中国是否当年的美国
2008年10月30日08:37
Wall Street Journal

Sebastian Mallaby

1944年7月，当出席联合国货币和金融会议的44国代表入住华盛顿山饭店(Mount Washington Hotel)的时候，布雷顿森林实在是没什么可看的。坐落在新罕布什尔州的这家饭店被一片差不多有100万英亩的森林包围着，除了一些可口可乐自动售货机，就没什么可让代表们分神的了。

就在这处几乎与世隔绝的地方，168名政治家（和仅有的一位女政治家、来自Vassar学院的Mabel Newcomer）一起参与演出了这段在治理世界经济方面最着名的历史片断。这次会议为防范再次发生大萧条重塑了世界金融秩序，并创建了一家史无前例的国际银行来专注于战后重建与发展。

在最后的全体会议上，盛装的与会代表们全场起立向英国经济学家凯恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)鼓掌致意。他的思想渗透于为期三周的会议。凯恩斯爵士向富有远见的同僚们表示感谢，说他们完成了预言家或先知才能做到的事。

布雷顿森林会议此后便披上了一层神话色彩。对经济史爱好者来说，它堪比制宪会议上美国建国之父们的那次聚会。而对那些急切希望被世界铭记的政治家来说，它是一个让人无比艳羡的时刻。最近，在英国首相布朗(Gordon Brown)和法国总统萨科齐(Nicolas Sarkozy)呼吁举行新的布雷顿森林会议后，布什总统表示同意。电视媒体风闻此事纷纷出动，在当年的华盛顿山饭店旁驻扎守候，这里已完成了一次耗资5,000万美元的装修改建工程。不过，布雷顿森林会议实际上已经不是第一次闹“复活”了。事实上，历史上已有很多先例。

1982年的拉丁美洲债务危机爆发后，美国财政部长里甘(Donald Regan)就提出重新召开布雷顿会议以稳定西半球货币。第二年，因法郎发生三次贬值，当时的法国总统密特朗(Francois Mitterrand)宣称，“现在真的到了该考虑新的布雷顿森林会议的时候了。除此之外，别无他法。”接下来的两年时间里，密特朗一直大肆鼓吹这一主张，直到1985年撒切尔夫人(Margaret Thatcher)批评他的建议是“不切合实际的胡言乱语”，他才算偃旗息鼓。

1997-98年的新兴市场危机之后，布雷顿森林怀旧病再次爆发──这次是在后撒切尔时代的英国。时任英国首相的布莱尔(Tony Blair)认为：我们不应惧怕极端、颠覆传统的思想。为了新千年，我们今天需要致力于建立新的布雷顿森林体系。应该说，布莱尔的新千年构想的具体内容很模糊。但没有哪个国家的首脑会鲁莽地指出这一点。

在国际社会围绕治理经济采取的重大举措中，或许只有马歇尔计划被提及的频率超过布雷顿森林会议，比如，为冷战结束后的东欧制定马歇尔计划、针对非洲的马歇尔计划、针对内陆城市的马歇尔计划等多个版本。的确，每一个想让华盛顿花大钱的人都会发现，拿马歇尔计划说事是再便当不过的做法了。

但布雷顿会议具有更丰富的内涵和更罕见的声望。它关乎重新建立国际秩序，而不仅是为一项有意义的事业而稳定货币。并且，马歇尔计划是美国着名的单边主义的范例，布雷顿森林会议则是国际多边合作的胜利。当时参加布雷顿会议的甚至包括洪都拉斯、利比里亚和菲律宾等国的代表（凯恩斯曾就此不屑地说到，那是一次“最恐怖的耍猴馆般”的集会），但不包括韩国和日本这两个当今世界经济强国。

布雷顿会议这两方面的成就即使是今年看来似乎仍有相当的吸引力，不过，这两方面也都有不切实际的成份。会议创建的一项固定汇率体系重新确立了经济秩序。其目标是防止货币竞相贬值的局面重演。竞相贬值的典型范例是“黄油战争”。1930年，通过将本币贬值，新西兰出口的黄油在海外市场享受到价格优势，其出口黄油的主要竞争对手丹麦于是在1931年也采取了将货币贬值的做法。之后，这两个国家你追我赶，一路贬值，幅度越来越大。

这种损人利己的做法加剧了最终拖垮了整个世界的贸易保护主义，而布雷顿森林会议对这个问题的解决之道可谓简洁明了。二战后，美元钉住黄金、其他货币钉住美元。不再有浮动汇率机制，也就不再有贬值大战。为支撑这一系统，布雷顿森林体系的缔造者们还创立了国际货币基金组织(IMF)，相对同门师兄世界银行(World Bank)而言，IMF在实现其缔造者目标的过程中发挥的作用要大得多。如果固定汇率机制令一个国家陷入收支失衡的危机，那么IMF会出手相救，使其货币避免贬值。

如今成立新货币体制的理念在很大程度上仍可以借鉴这种观点。重创全球金融市场的信贷泡沫部分源于现行货币制度的双轨状态：一些国家允许货币自由浮动，另一些国家把本币与美元松散地挂钩在一起。在过去差不多五年的时间里，制度上的不统一制造了上世纪30年代的一个翻版：作为让本币钉住美元的最大经济体，中国将人民币汇率保持于低位，致使亚洲其他出口国也纷纷压低汇价。正是在这新一轮汇率操纵大战中，这些钉住美元的国家敛集了巨额贸易顺差。他们的收益不断回流至国际金融体系中，令信贷泡沫持续膨胀，在破灭后酿成今天的灾难。

说服中国改变其货币政策会是新布雷顿森林会议一个值得追求的目标。不过汇改问题在此次会议的议事日程上排名靠后（布什政府提议会议于11月15日举行，并将其定性为“20国集团会议”，对欧洲方面所谓的第二次布雷顿森林会议的说法置之不理）。力主召开此次会议的英、法领导人要求在会上讨论金融监管问题，例如何如完善评级机构、加强银行业透明度等等。很多相关议题对跨国合作的要求都很低。

如果欧洲闭嘴不提要求中国放松钉住美元政策的话，那或许是因为他们预见到了自己要为这一要求所做出的让步。中国是不会为了国际金融体系而放弃其出口拉动型经济增长政策的，除非这样能令它在该体系中获得更大利益──这意味着在IMF获得大得多的发言权，同时相应削弱欧洲原本过大的影响力。抛开有关银行业透明度的胡言乱语，这才是这次会议需要达成的核心协议。自然欧洲人不会提出这样的建议。

以何种形式将中国纳入多边机制核心的问题取决于中美这两个大国。这和第一次布雷顿森林会议时倒颇为相像──在多边谈判的表象下其实就是两个大国之间的讨价还价。二战之后，英国这个骄傲但负债累累的帝国需要美国人的存款来稳定货币体系，它付出的代价就是让美国人在IMF的设计及构架问题上拥有最终决定权。三十年河东，三十年河西，如今的美国必须扮演当年英国的角色，而今天的中国则必须扮演当年美国的角色。

然而，这里还有一个意想不到的转折。上世纪40年代时，衰落一方奉行的是帝国式贸易政策，崛起一方倡导的则是开放的全球经济模式。当罗斯福(Franklin Roosevelt)对邱吉尔(Churchill)说，实现自由贸易是英国获得战后援助的代价时，罗斯福是在要求终结殖民地政策、建立平等的商业竞争舞台；邱吉尔回答到：总统先生，我想你是想废除大英帝国，但尽管如此，我们知道美国是英国唯一的希望。

而今，崛起的一方一直在通过低汇率推行重商主义政策。坐拥2万亿美元巨额外汇储备的中国政府有可能答应为西方金融机构提供资金帮助，但条件是在IMF里扮演更重要的角色。但中国人也有可能对此兴趣全无。全球货币体系的未来取决于中国是否有心充当罗斯福──或者它宁愿做现代版的邱吉尔。

（编者按：本文作者Sebastian Mallaby是美国外交关系委员会(Council On Foreign Relations)地缘经济研究中心(Center for Geoeconomic Studies)主任。目前他正在撰写有关对冲基金历史的文章。）

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A 21st-Century Bretton Woods
汉 大 中 小2008年10月30日08:37

There wasn't much to see in Bretton Woods in July 1944, when delegates from 44 countries checked into the sprawling Mount Washington Hotel for the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference. Almost a million acres of New Hampshire forest surrounded the site; there were free Coca-Cola dispensers, but few other distractions.

In this scene of rustic isolation, 168 statesmen (and one lone stateswoman, Mabel Newcomer of Vassar College) joined in history's most celebrated episode of economic statecraft, remaking the world's monetary order to fend off another Great Depression and creating an unprecedented multinational bank, to be focused on postwar reconstruction and development.

At the Final Plenary, a sea of black-tied delegates gave a standing ovation to British economist John Maynard Keynes, whose intellect had permeated the three weeks of talks. Lord Keynes paid tribute to his far-seeing colleagues, who had performed a task appropriate 'to the prophet and to the soothsayer.'

The Bretton Woods conference has acquired mythical status. To economic-history buffs, it's akin to the gathering of the founding fathers at the constitutional convention. To politicians anxious to make their marks upon the world, it's a moment to be richly envied. The recent calls from British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy for a new Bretton Woods conference, to which the Bush administration has acceded, have caused TV crews to descend upon the old hotel, which has undergone a $50 million facelift. But Bretton Woods revivalism is nothing new. Indeed, it's a long tradition.

After the onset of the Latin debt crisis in 1982, U.S. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan floated the idea of a new Bretton Woods to steady the hemisphere's currencies. The following year, reeling from three devaluations of the franc, French President Francois Mitterrand declared, 'The time has really come to think in terms of a new Bretton Woods. Outside this proposition, there will be no salvation.' Mitterrand persisted in this grandiloquence over the next two years. He finally quieted down in 1985, when Margaret Thatcher dismissed his proposal as 'generalized jabberwocky.'

In the wake of the emerging-market crises of 1997-98, Bretton Woods nostalgia broke out again -- this time in post-Thatcher Britain. 'We should not be afraid to think radically and fundamentally,' Tony Blair opined. 'We need to commit ourselves today to build a new Bretton Woods for the next millennium.' The precise content of Mr. Blair's millennial ambition was, shall we say, vague. But no fellow leader was rude enough to say so.

Among acts of international economic statesmanship, perhaps only the Marshall Plan has been invoked more frequently. There have been calls for a Marshall Plan for postcommunist eastern Europe, a Marshall Plan for Africa, a Marshall Plan for the inner cities. Indeed, anybody wanting Washington to splurge finds Marshall exceedingly convenient.

But Bretton Woods has a richer and more rarefied cachet. It was about reordering the international system, not just mobilizing money for an enlightened cause. And whereas the Marshall Plan was an example of the unilateralism for which the U.S. is known, the Bretton Woods conference was a triumph of multilateral coordination. It featured countries as diverse as Honduras, Liberia and the Philippines (Keynes spoke disdainfully of a 'most monstrous monkey-house'), though it did not include South Korea or Japan, important voices in today's economic summitry.

Both sides of the Bretton Woods achievement seem alluring today, yet both may be chimerical. The conference rebuilt the economic order by creating a system of fixed exchange rates. The aim was to prevent a return to the competitive devaluations best illustrated by the 'butter wars.' In 1930 New Zealand secured a cost advantage for its butter exports by devaluing its money; Denmark, its main butter rival, responded with its own devaluation in 1931; the two nations proceeded to chase each other down with progressively more drastic devaluations.

This beggar-thy-neighbor behavior added to the protectionism that brought the world to ruin, and the Bretton Woods answer was simple. In the postwar era, the dollar would be anchored to gold, and other currencies would be anchored to the dollar: No more fluctuating money, ergo no competitive devaluation. To undergird this system, the Bretton Woods architects created the International Monetary Fund, which was far more central to their ambitions than their other legacy, the World Bank. If a country's fixed exchange rate led it into a balance of payments crisis, the IMF would bail it out and so avert devaluation.

Today the idea of another monetary rebirth has much to recommend it. The credit bubble that has wreaked havoc on the world's financial markets has its origins in a two-headed monetary order: Some countries allow their currencies to float, while others peg loosely to the dollar. Over the past five years or so, this mixture created a variation on the 1930s: China, the largest dollar pegger, kept its currency cheap, driving rival exporters in Asia to hold their exchange rates down also. Thanks to this new version of competitive currency manipulation, the dollar-peggers racked up gargantuan trade surpluses. Their earnings were pumped back into the international financial system, inflating a credit bubble that now has popped disastrously.

Persuading China to change its currency policy would be a worthy goal for a new Bretton Woods conference. But currency reform is low on the agenda of the summit that the Bush administration plans to host on Nov. 15. (The administration styles this gathering a 'G-20 meeting,' ignoring the European talk of a Bretton Woods II.) The British and French leaders who pushed for the meeting want instead to talk about financial regulation -- how to fix rating agencies, how to boost transparency at banks and so on. But many of these tasks require minimal multilateral coordination.

If the Europeans shrink from demanding that China cease pegging to the dollar, it's perhaps because they anticipate the concession that would be asked of them. China isn't going to give up its export-led growth strategy for the sake of the international system unless it gets a bigger stake in that system -- meaning a much bigger voice within the International Monetary Fund and a corresponding reduction in Europe's exaggerated influence. When you strip out the blather about bank transparency and such, this is the core bargain that needs to be struck. Naturally, the Europeans aren't proposing it.

It will be up to the two great powers -- the U.S. and China -- to fashion the deal that brings China into the heart of the multilateral system. Here, too, is an echo of the first Bretton Woods, for underneath the camouflage of a multilateral process there was a bargain between two nations. Britain, the proud but indebted imperial power, needed American savings to underpin monetary stability in the postwar era; the quid pro quo was that the U.S. had the final say on the IMF's design and structure. Today the U.S. must play Britain's role, and China must play the American one.

There's a final twist, however. In the 1940s the declining power practiced imperial trade preferences; the rising power championed an open world economy. When Franklin Roosevelt told Winston Churchill that free trade would be the price of postwar assistance, he was demanding an end to the colonial order and the creation of a level playing field for commerce. 'Mr. President, I think you want to abolish the British empire,' Churchill protested. 'But in spite of that, we know you are our only hope.'

Today it is the rising power that pursues mercantilist policies via its exchange rate. China's leadership, which sits atop an astonishing $2 trillion in foreign-currency savings, could trade a promise to help recapitalize Western finance for an expanded role within the IMF. But China may simply not be interested. The future of the global monetary system depends on whether China aspires to play the role of Roosevelt -- or whether it prefers to be a modern Churchill.

Sebastian Mallaby

(Sebastian Mallaby directs the Center for Geoeconomic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is writing a history of hedge funds.)